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Who wants their own country to remain in the EU – and who would like the UK to stay?

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Approach

The main report of this project presented a descriptive overview both of how much different country's respondents and subgroups within favoured on the one hand their own country staying in the EU¹ and on the other hand the desirability for Britain to remain.² While these analyses provide a meaningful insight into the characteristics of proponents and opponents of EU membership from both perspectives, we need multivariate analyses to properly establish what factors are ultimately relevant in determining whether a person is more likely to wish for their own country and the UK respectively to remain in the EU or to leave.

In this briefing we present a set of such multivariate regression analyses that allow us to assess the relationship to these choices with multiple factors simultaneously. This means that we can assess the respective relationship between any particular variable on the outcome of interest controlling for all the other factors included.

For both outcomes we proceed as follows: we first estimate the effects of the socio-demographic variables (age, sex and educational attainment). We do this for the full sample including dummy variables for the countries, to estimate whether differences between the countries are significant and remain so when controlling for the independent variables. We then run the models for each country separately to establish whether the different factors matter in the same way in all countries or whether different profiles of respondents emerge. Finally, we add a set of further explanatory variables capturing different important aspects differentiating respondents from each other on a range of political attitude domains:

- Trust both in their respective national parliament³ and the EU parliament⁴ to estimate a measure attitudes directed at actual political institutions at both the national and supranational level
- National identity⁵ and European identity⁶ as more affective measures of orientations at both levels
- Two pragmatic evaluations: whether individuals think immigration is good or bad for their country's economy⁷ and their self-perceived political position on the left-right spectrum⁸

For our analyses of whether people would like the UK to remain or leave we add a further dimension of predictors:

¹ "If a referendum on [own country]'s membership in the EU were to be held, would you vote for [own country] to remain a member of the EU or to leave the EU?" – coded as binary variable (0: Would vote to leave; 1: Would vote to remain), excluding those saying "don't know"

² "Should Britain remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?" – coded as binary variable (0: Should leave; 1: Should remain)

³ "How much trust to you have in [National parliament]?" – 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust), excluding those saying "don't know"

⁴ "How much trust to you have in the European Parliament?" – 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust), excluding those saying "don't know"

⁵ "Below is a scale from 1 to 7 to describe to what extent you think of yourself as European. The more European you feel, the further to the right you would put yourself. The less European you feel, the further to the left you would put yourself. Where would you put yourself on this scale?", excluding those who skipped the question

⁶ "And here is a similar scale I would like you to use to describe to what extent you think of yourself as [COUNTRY ADJECTIVE from COUNTRY OF RESPONDENT]. Where would you put yourself on this scale?"

⁷ "On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is extremely bad and 10 is extremely good, would you it is generally bad or good for [Country]'s economy that migrants come to [Country] from other countries?"

⁸ Self-positioning on left-right scale: "In political matters, people often talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. Generally speaking, how would you place your views on a scale where '1' means 'the left' and '10' means 'the right'?", excluding those who did not answer

- Expectations of what would happen to the UK's economy should Britain decide to leave the EU
- Whether people think the membership of the UK in the EU is good for Britain itself
- Whether people think the membership of the UK in the EU is good for the rest of the EU

Results for views on own country's EU membership in a hypothetical referendum

In table 20 of the main report we have shown the differences in support of staying in the EU between the six countries if referenda were to be held there. The results below show that these differences are indeed statistically significant and robust to socio-demographic controls (table 1). French and Swedish respondents who report a view on how they would vote in such a referendum are significantly less likely to vote for their countries to remain EU members compared to German respondents. On the other hand Polish, Irish and Spanish respondents are significantly more likely than Germans to vote to remain in the EU. These relationships also remain robust when we add further attitudinal variables (table 2) with the exception of France: once the attitudinal characteristics are taken into account, French respondents have the same likelihood as German respondents to vote to remain in or leave the EU. This suggests that the higher likelihood of French respondents to vote to leave is indeed shaped by differences in their attitudes towards the issues investigated.

The socio-demographic results emphasise the importance of analysing the different countries separately: the profiles of EU supporters and opponents differ. Regarding age (and controlling for sex and education), in Germany, France and Sweden 35-54 olds are significantly less likely than 18-34 year olds to vote to remain members, but there is no difference between 18-34 year olds and those 55 or above. In Poland and Ireland we find a very different relationship: Older respondents are actually more likely to vote to remain than younger respondents (with those 55 and older significantly different from 18-34 year olds in both countries and those 35-54 year old in Poland as well). In Spain there is no significant relationship between age and whether respondents want their country to stay in the EU.

For sex, most countries show no significant differences between men and women, except for Sweden, where women are marginally less likely to vote for continued EU membership than men. For education, there is also a mostly consistent pattern: higher education is associated with greater support for remaining in the EU in all countries, except in Poland, where this relationship is not statistically significant. Some of these relationships do not remain significant when also taking into account the attitudinal variables, suggesting that those attitudes are partially patterned by age and education.

For institutional trust it is unsurprising to find that those who have greater levels of trust in the European Parliament are also significantly more likely to say they would vote to remain in the EU in a referendum. For Germany, France, Spain and Ireland there is no relationship between trust in national parliaments and the likelihood of voting to remain. However, for Poland and to a slightly lesser extent for Sweden there is: those who have greater trust in their national parliaments are significantly less likely to want their country to remain a member of the European Union.

While there is variation in that variable, we find a consistent picture when looking at national identity (controlling for all other factors) – but one that may be surprising. Those who identify more strongly with their own country are more likely to vote to remain inside the European Union in all cases, while identification with the European Union is not relevant in any of the countries, except marginally in France (where higher levels of European identification are associated with a greater likelihood to want to leave the EU).

We find a similarly consistent picture for the pragmatic evaluation of the role of immigrants: those who think that immigration is good for the economy are significantly more likely to support a continued EU membership, except for respondents in Spain, where there is no significant relationship. The effect for a person's self-positioning on the left-right scale is less pronounced. It is (marginally) significant in Spain, Poland and Sweden but in different directions: In Poland those who position themselves further to the right are less likely to vote to stay in the EU, while those who are more right in their self-position in Spain and Sweden are somewhat more likely to wish to remain part of the European Union.

Results for views on Britain's EU membership

Differences between the six countries (see table 1 in the main report) in the extent to which people wish for Britain to remain in the EU are indeed statistically significant when controlling for socio-demographics. French and Swedish respondents are less likely than Germans to want Britain to remain, while Irish, Polish and Spanish respondents are more favourable in comparison (table 3).

Like reported above, we find variations in the socio-demographic profiles of proponents and opponents of EU membership for Britain between our countries in the multivariate analyses where we estimate the respective relationships controlling for all other predictors. However, once we also incorporate views on Britain's membership in the EU specifically this changes. In the final models we continue to find that oldest respondents are more likely to wish for the UK to remain in Poland only (table 5). Women in Germany, France and Poland also remain less likely to want to see Britain leave. The positive effect of education remains only significant in France. This suggests that most socio-demographic differences are reflected in the differences in attitudes that different groups of individuals share.

Trust in national parliaments only matters extensively in Poland, where greater levels of trust are indeed significantly related to a higher likelihood of wanting Britain to leave the EU (table 4). A similar relationship is found in Germany, but with a smaller magnitude and only marginally significant. There is also marginally significant relationship for Ireland with a modest effect size in the opposite direction – with those having greater trust in their national parliament being more likely to want Britain to remain an EU member. However, all of these relationships are rendered insignificant once we take into account the specific evaluations of the UK's membership, suggesting the initially observed relationships were spurious (table 5).

We observed a more substantial effect for trust in the European Parliament which was associated with a significantly greater desire for Britain to remain a member as well – suggesting that the overall attitude towards the EU is partially applied to the desirability to keep a particular member in this case. The relationship was robust for all countries, except France, when we took into account the UK-specific evaluations.

Institutional attitudes seem to matter more on this level than affective orientations, as a stronger feeling of European identification was only positive associated in a significant manner in Poland (robustly). A greater level of national identification however was related positively and significantly with a desire for Britain to remain a member of the EU in all six countries initially (though the effect was rendered insignificant for Sweden in the final model incorporating the UK-specific evaluations).

Finally, left-right attitudes effectively did not matter in the countries for the question of whether Britain should remain a member. However, more positive attitudes about the role of immigrants for the economy were significantly associated with greater levels of support for Britain to remain part of the European Union. The effect remained only significant for Poland and (marginally) for Spain, suggesting that the general relationship between attitudes towards

migrants and attitudes towards the UK's membership were spurious to concrete evaluations about the UK.

Views on Britain specifically unsurprisingly then were substantially related to whether people wanted the UK to remain in the EU or not. Except for Germany, whether people thought Britain's economy would be better or worse after leaving the EU mattered in their decision. In the other five countries those who thought the UK's economy would be worse off were more likely to want Britain to remain. The effect was most pronounced in Sweden, followed by Poland and Spain.

Those who thought that the UK's membership was good for the EU were substantially more likely to want Britain to remain part of the union in all countries. People in all countries, except Spain, were also more likely to want the UK to remain if they thought the membership of the UK was good for Britain itself. The effect was less strong than the evaluation of what the membership meant for the EU in Germany and France, but of similar strength in Poland, Ireland and Sweden.

Table 1: Logistic regression models for vote decision (remain) in hypothetical referendum on EU membership in own country as dependent variable (socio-demographic comparison)

	All		Germany		France		Poland		Spain		Ireland		Sweden	
	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.
Intercept	1.42	.10***	1.76	.21**	0.88	.18	1.43	.20 ⁺	2.59	.18***	2.25	.25***	1.20	.22 ⁺
<u>Age: 18-35</u>														
35-54	0.88	.07*	0.58	.17***	0.71	.16*	1.67	.16***	0.85	.18	1.19	.21	0.66	.19*
55+	1.35	.07***	1.01	.17	0.87	.16	3.90	.18***	1.30	.19	1.93	.24**	0.81	.19
Female	0.99	.06	0.91	.13	1.21	.12	1.05	.14	0.92	.14	0.97	.18	0.76	.15 ⁺
<u>Educ.: ≤ Lower Sec</u>														
Tertiary education	2.28	.08***	2.46	.19***	3.38	.17***	1.40	.22	2.62	.18***	1.91	.23**	1.58	.21*
Upper/Post-Sec.	1.41	.07***	1.64	.16**	1.48	.15**	1.25	.19	1.57	.18**	1.25	.21	0.87	.19
<u>Country: Germany</u>														
France	0.61	.09***												
Poland	1.46	.09***												
Spain	1.81	.10***												
Ireland	1.77	.11***												
Sweden	0.48	.10***												
Nagelkerke R ²	0.028		0.043		0.078		0.080		0.056		0.028		0.035	
N	6686		1291		1175		1271		1304		847		798	

Displayed are odds ratios from a logistic regression model with coefficient standard errors and indications of levels of statistical significance.

***p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05, ⁺p<0.10

Table 2: Logistic regression models for vote decision (remain) in hypothetical referendum on EU membership in own country as dependent variable with multiple predictors

	All		Germany		France		Poland		Spain		Ireland		Sweden	
	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.
Intercept	0.02	.25***	0.02	.57***	0.02	.57***	0.15	.68**	0.01	.53***	0.01	.74***	0.01	.67***
<u>Age: 18-35</u>														
35-54	1.08	.10	0.76	.22	1.01	.24	1.40	.23	0.88	.23	1.73	.29 ⁺	0.97	.28
55+	1.41	.10***	1.08	.23	1.45	.23	2.52	.26***	0.88	.25	1.95	.31*	0.95	.28
Female	0.97	.08	1.07	.17	1.35	.18 ⁺	0.93	.19	1.14	.18	0.92	.24	0.48	.21***
<u>Educ.: ≤ Lower Sec</u>														
Tertiary education	1.53	.10***	1.63	.26 ⁺	1.86	.25*	0.94	.33	1.75	.22*	1.80	.30 ⁺	1.16	.29
Upper/Post-Sec.	1.23	.09*	1.20	.22	1.42	.22	0.89	.29	1.41	.23	2.02	.30*	0.71	.27
Nat. Parliament trust	0.90	.02***	1.00	.05	0.94	.05	0.81	.04***	0.96	.06	1.02	.06	0.85	.06**
EU Parliament trust	1.57	.02***	1.47	.05***	1.26	.06***	1.52	.04***	1.38	.06***	1.58	.07***	1.98	.07***
National ID	1.58	.03***	1.49	.06***	2.06	.07***	1.44	.07***	2.08	.07***	1.40	.07***	1.35	.07***
European ID	0.99	.03	0.97	.06	0.89	.07 ⁺	0.98	.08	1.03	.06	1.08	.07	0.94	.07
Immigration-Econ.	1.18	.02***	1.26	.04***	1.20	.04***	1.16	.04***	1.06	.04	1.15	.05**	1.21	.04***
Left-Right ID	0.99	.02	0.97	.05	0.96	.04	0.91	.05*	1.08	.04 ⁺	1.10	.06	1.11	.05*
<u>Country: Germany</u>														
France	0.99	.12												
Poland	1.44	.13**												
Spain	1.66	.12***												
Ireland	2.42	.14***												
Sweden	0.48	.13***												
Nagelkerke R ²	0.492		0.506		0.550		0.486		0.446		0.445		0.533	
N	5906		1181		1029		1082		1211		715		688	

Displayed are odds ratios from a logistic regression model with coefficient standard errors and indications of levels of statistical significance.

***p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05, ⁺p<0.10

Table 3: Logistic regression models for view on British EU membership (forced choice: remain) as dependent variable (socio-demographic comparison)

	All		Germany		France		Poland		Spain		Ireland		Sweden	
	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.
Intercept	2.01	.09***	1.82	.20**	1.26	.16	1.62	.19*	4.73	.19***	2.48	.24***	2.46	.20***
<u>Age: 18-35</u>														
35-54	0.90	.07	0.82	.16	0.57	.15***	1.82	.15***	0.65	.18*	1.28	.19	0.74	.18+
55+	1.09	.07	0.89	.16	0.51	.14***	4.36	.18***	0.91	.19	2.13	.22***	0.81	.18
Female	1.29	.05***	1.56	.12***	1.57	.11***	1.26	.14+	1.16	.14	1.08	.17	0.89	.14
<u>Educ.: ≤ Lower Sec</u>														
Tertiary education	1.59	.07***	1.63	.18**	1.95	.15***	1.37	.22	1.38	.17+	1.60	.22*	1.39	.19+
Upper/Post-Sec.	1.18	.07*	1.48	.15**	1.19	.13	1.25	.18	1.01	.17	0.94	.20	0.96	.17
<u>Country: Germany</u>														
France	0.46	.08***												
Poland	1.49	.09***												
Spain	1.69	.09***												
Ireland	1.43	.10***												
Sweden	0.74	.09***												
Nagelkerke R ²	0.073		0.025		0.064		0.085		0.017		0.031		0.013	
N	7837		1486		1457		1469		1478		965		982	

Displayed are odds ratios from a logistic regression model with coefficient standard errors and indications of levels of statistical significance.

***p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05, +p<0.10

Table 4: Logistic regression models for view on British EU membership (forced choice: remain) as dependent variable with multiple predictors

	All		Germany		France		Poland		Spain		Ireland		Sweden	
	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.
Intercept	0.08	.21***	0.10	.46***	0.10	.44***	0.07	.65***	0.16	.41***	0.06	.64***	0.06	.55***
<u>Age: 18-35</u>														
35-54	1.01	.09	1.08	.20	0.71	.18 ⁺	1.50	.22 ⁺	0.68	.21 ⁺	1.44	.26	1.02	.24
55+	0.97	.09	0.87	.20	0.54	.18***	2.39	.25***	0.65	.22 ⁺	1.79	.29*	1.01	.25
Female	1.35	.07***	1.67	.15***	1.66	.14***	1.39	.19 ⁺	1.32	.16 ⁺	1.15	.22	0.72	.19 ⁺
<u>Educ.: ≤ Lower Sec</u>														
Tertiary education	1.09	.09	1.18	.22	1.19	.19	0.91	.31	0.99	.20	1.49	.29	1.06	.25
Upper/Post-Sec.	1.04	.08	1.30	.19	1.08	.17	1.10	.27	0.85	.20	1.03	.27	0.81	.23
Nat. Parliament trust	0.93	.02***	0.93	.04 ⁺	0.97	.04	0.90	.03**	0.95	.05	1.11	.06 ⁺	0.93	.05
EU Parliament trust	1.37	.02***	1.41	.05***	1.20	.05***	1.33	.04***	1.25	.05***	1.37	.06***	1.58	.06***
National ID	1.32	.02***	1.39	.05***	1.38	.05***	1.35	.06***	1.48	.06***	1.26	.06***	1.21	.06***
European ID	1.05	.02*	0.98	.05	1.02	.05	1.17	.07*	1.08	.05	1.04	.06	1.06	.06
Immigration-Econ.	1.13	.01***	1.08	.03*	1.10	.03***	1.24	.04***	1.08	.03*	1.11	.05*	1.16	.04***
Left-Right ID	1.00	.02	0.97	.04	1.02	.03	0.91	.05 ⁺	1.00	.04	1.02	.06	1.03	.04
<u>Country: Germany</u>														
France	0.63	.10***												
Poland	1.62	.12***												
Spain	1.56	.11***												
Ireland	1.90	.13***												
Sweden	0.82	.11 ⁺												
Nagelkerke R ²	0.322		0.316		0.280		0.380		0.209		0.331		0.340	
N	6566		1298		1186		1180		1324		782		796	

Displayed are odds ratios from a logistic regression model with coefficient standard errors and indications of levels of statistical significance.

***p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05, ⁺p<0.10

Table 5: Logistic regression models for view on British EU membership (forced choice: remain) as dependent variable with multiple predictors

	All		Germany		France		Poland		Spain		Ireland		Sweden	
	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.	Odds-R.	s.e.
Intercept	0.32	.27***	0.77	.58	0.29	.58*	.14	.02*	0.22	.52**	0.63	.90	0.45	.89
<u>Age: 18-35</u>														
35-54	0.92	.10	0.99	.23	0.79	.22	1.13	.26	0.77	.24	1.05	.34	1.00	.35
55+	0.94	.10	0.80	.23	0.83	.23	2.20	.30**	0.86	.25	1.19	.37	0.78	.34
Female	1.39	.08***	1.53	.18*	1.65	.17**	1.77	.23*	1.29	.18	0.85	.28	0.88	.26
<u>Educ.: ≤ Lower Sec</u>														
Tertiary education	1.08	.11	1.11	.26	1.39	.24	0.97	.37	0.88	.22	1.27	.38	0.74	.36
Upper/Post-Sec.	1.05	.10	1.01	.22	1.57	.21*	1.07	.33	0.84	.23	0.87	.35	0.60	.33
Nat. Parliament trust	0.95	.02**	0.94	.05	1.03	.05	0.94	.04	0.95	.05	1.11	.07	1.03	.07
EU Parliament trust	1.27	.02***	1.31	.06***	1.08	.06	1.25	.05***	1.20	.05***	1.29	.08***	1.29	.08***
National ID	1.26	.03***	1.37	.06***	1.39	.06***	1.33	.07***	1.42	.07***	1.20	.08*	1.05	.08
European ID	1.01	.03	0.96	.06	0.96	.07	1.21	.09*	1.04	.06	0.94	.09	1.10	.09
Immigration-Econ.	1.08	.02***	1.04	.04	1.06	.04	1.18	.05***	1.07	.04+	1.05	.06	1.07	.05
Left-Right ID	1.00	.02	0.96	.05	1.03	.03	0.91	.06	1.01	.04	1.01	.07	1.04	.06
<u>Country: Germany</u>														
France	0.63	.12***												
Poland	1.45	.14**												
Spain	1.62	.13***												
Ireland	1.24	.15												
Sweden	0.78	.14+												
<u>Brexit Econ: Better</u>														
No difference	1.96	.10***	0.98	.25	1.65	.22*	2.54	.26***	2.65	.23***	1.53	.35	2.89	.28***
Worse	3.26	.11***	1.43	.23	2.30	.25***	3.14	.32***	5.12	.27***	5.00	.38***	7.20	.41***
<u>UK MS. for UK: Good</u>														
Neither	0.67	.10***	0.67	.23+	0.73	.21	0.33	.29***	1.09	.22	0.42	.35*	0.63	.32
Bad	0.25	.11***	0.36	.25***	0.34	.27***	0.13	.30***	0.76	.27	0.07	.41***	0.07	.34***
<u>UK MS. for EU: Good</u>														
Neither	0.40	.09***	0.33	.21***	0.33	.21***	0.68	.25	0.37	.22***	0.57	.32+	0.30	.28***
Bad	0.10	.12***	0.10	.23***	0.04	.27***	0.21	.40***	0.19	.26***	0.11	.59***	0.14	.50***
Nagelkerke R ²	0.482		0.451		0.508		0.520		0.318		0.571		0.635	
N	5818		1177		1043		1029		1187		709		673	

Displayed are odds ratios from a logistic regression model with coefficient standard errors and indications of levels of statistical significance.
 ***p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05, +p<0.10